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WHERE IS ANONYMOUS REPRODUCTION TAKING US
NOW?
Susan L. Crockin, JD
Ten years ago I was asked to present a plenary address at the 1 1 th
World Congress on IVF and Human Reproductive Genetics, held in
Sydney, Australia entitled "Where is Anonymous Reproduction Taking
Us?" The question was both novel and provocative. I spent weeks
pondering it and debating what, as an American lawyer who had
decided to open an adoption and reproductive technology practice a
decade earlier, I could contribute to answering it. Ultimately, my
presentation evolved into an exploration of what I had for the past
decade viewed as the increasingly intertwined practices of both
adoption and reproductive medicine, of the many legal tensions that
developed as family building added more participants and intricacies,
and of what I hoped the future would bring-a child-centered, multi-
disciplinary regulatory and policy framework.
I suggested the past should inform future practices, analogized
sperm and egg donation to adoption--- drawing both parallels and
distinctions, and argued that multi-disciplinary policies and regulations
were necessary to protect first and foremost the resulting offspring. In
the subsequently published plenary proceedings, my article concluded
in part:
"The existing model of reproductive medicine, where
patients with their physicians make private and unfettered
decisions about their family building efforts, is beginning
to show the strains of modem times ... the legal tensions
reflected in recent court battles illustrate that adding
anonymous or known gamete or embryo donation to efforts
to enable patients to have a child raises fundamentally
different questions-and societally broader concerns.
... future ART policies and regulation in the US need not
necessarily or beneficially follow the historical, medical
model of secrecy-based anonymous donor insemination.
Instead, the future of the ARTs could benefit from a more
open, inclusive model-one that recognizes the legitimate
concerns of donors and acknowledges the primacy of the
needs and interests, not of the adult patients, but of the
recipient children.
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By looking carefully at the lessons of the past, and
collaborating on interdisciplinary efforts looking toward the
future, it is hoped that we can accept the challenge of
creating a more thoughtful, consistent and comprehensive
framework for the assisted reproductive technologies and,
by doing so, protect the children that modem medicine has
made possible."1
I was wholly unprepared for the audience's reaction to my talk.
As I finished, the side aisles filled with donor-conceived adults moving
to the microphones. Tears streamed down the faces of several. The
words of one man will never leave me: "Thank you for speaking for us,
for listening and for caring about us." Many told me, during both the
formal question and answer period and afterwards, that they had never
heard their concerns or their interests voiced in public before.
Fast forward a decade: the practice of reproductive medicine
has undergone some remarkable changes and been remarkably resistant
to others. Gamete donation is now big business, with a dizzying
proliferation of match-makers known as "brokers," "facilitators,"
"recruiters" or self-identified but unregulated "agencies" (all referred to
here as "recruiters') and last year a new entity emerged offering
"concierge" services to interface between recruiters and would-be-
parents to assure they find "the one" right donor -for yet an additional
fee.
In an odd asymmetry, we are simultaneously seeing a surge in:
1) professional interest in increased openness and the development of
gamete registries; and 2) promises of anonymous gamete and embryo
donation, including frozen eggs and donated embryos created from
donor sperm and egg, with no plan or expectation for future contact or
information sharing other than basic medical data. The disparity in
these views reflects a remarkable schism in approaches.
THE STATE OF THE LAW:
Only a handful of states address egg donation practices, largely
in the context of assigning parentage to recipients similar to more
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2common and long-standing sperm donation statutes. Until more states
enact egg donation statutes, egg donation practices will continue, by
analogy, to rely on sperm donation law. Recent proposed model acts
reflect an increased interest in relying on intent-based parentage models
and reducing or extinguishing distinctions based on marriage.
3
Voluntary professional guidelines promulgated by the ASRM simply
state that "[egg] donors and recipients and their partners, if applicable,
should execute documents that define or limit their rights and duties
with regard to any offspring." 4 No comparable provision appears in the
guidelines for sperm donation.
Egg donation litigation has been rare. There are only a handful
of reported cases of which this author is aware involving custody
disputes over children born via egg donation. All were aberrational in
one or more respects, and three resoundingly rejected any greater claim
by the biological parent. One involved divorcing spouses where the
husband's custody claim based on being the only genetic parent was
rejected by the courts. 5 In a 2007 case involving a non-married couple
and their triplets, the court also rejected the biological father's claim.
Instead it found that the couple's intent to create a family, their signed
standard IVF consent form stating the woman ("wife" according to the
form's unaltered language) would be the mother, their agreement to list
her as the mother on the children's birth certificates, and her raising the
children for several months supported a legal finding of maternity. In
the fourth dispute, an unmarried couple who had used anonymous
donor egg and a gestational carrier ended up in a bitterly contested,
two-state, parentage and custody dispute with the gestational carrier
who gained custody of the children at birth.7 The biological father and
his partner ultimately enlisted their previously anonymous egg donor to
assert a maternity claim on their behalf. The donor, a 21 year-old
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §8-702 (2008); Fla. Stat. §742.11 (2007); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 14
18-01 (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 10, §554 (2007); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.702 (2007);
Utah Code Ann. §78-45g-702 (2007); Va. Code Ann. §20-156 (2008); Wash. Rev.
Code
§26.26.705 (2008); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-902 (2007).
3 See, e.g.: Model Uniform Parentage Act §7600 et.seq.; ABA Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology (2008) §§ 601-607.
4 2006 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation, ASRM Practice Committee,
Vol. 86Spu.4 Nov. 2006.
5 McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D.2d 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
6 In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005).
7 J.F. v. D.B., 116 Ohio St. 3d 363 (Ohio 2007); and, Flynn v. Bimber, 2005 Pa. Dist.
& Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 188 (Pa. C.P. 2005)
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unmarried Texan, stated clearly and publicly that she was asserting her
claim solely to bolster the intended recipient couple's (ultimately
successful) claim. In the fifth dispute, a former female couple litigated
parentage and custody of five-year-old twins born to one of the women
using the eggs of the other. Ultimately, the appellate court reversed
lower court rulings that one of the women was simply a donor and
awarded parental status to both women, despite standard IVF consent
forms that identified the genetic mother as a donor and starkly differed
from the original oral agreement. 8
With the exception noted above where the donor asserted her
rights at the request of the intended parents, there are no, reported cases
of an egg donor attempting to assert legal maternity of a child born to
an unrelated couple to whom she had previously and intentionally
donated her eggs.9  There is one reported case of an egg donor
objecting to a physician's splitting her eggs and providing them to a
second couple without her knowledge and consent. The donor entered
into an anonymous legal agreement with the first couple, but not the
second. That claim settled with the second couple ultimately allowed
to use the embryos created with the donor's eggs. 10
The relatively rare litigation over children born via egg donation
should alleviate many of the concerns raised by would-be parents. At
the same time, the relatively non-existent state of the law creates an
opportunity to explore both the remaining legal uncertainties and future
directions that egg donation policies might take.
THE STATE OF THE LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES?
Egg donation presents other legal issues and vulnerabilities
beyond custody of children. Although currently untested, the case law
that has developed over control of frozen embryos between divorcing
spouses suggests that a genetic stakeholder has a constitutional right of
non-procreation sufficient to halt any use of embryos he or she helped
create. In A.Z. v. B.Z, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made
8 K.M. v. E.G., 37 Cal. 4th 130 (Cal. 2005) [rehearing denied by M. (K.) v. G. (E.),
2005 Cal. LEXIS 11804 (Cal. 2005).
9 Beyond the scope of this article are cases involving 'mixed-up' gametes or embryos
where, through professional mishandling, an intended parent's genetic material is
inadvertently used to create a child for another individual or couple. In those cases,
competing maternity and paternity claims present distinct, serious, and oftentimes
heart-wrenching scenarios.
10Options Nat. Fertility Registry v. Dr. Allon, et. al. and related cases(Jud.Dis.190th,
Harris Cty, TX, 1/10/05).
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it clear for the first time that a husband who no longer wanted his wife
to use their embryos for procreation had a constitutionally protected
right to stop her to avoid "forced procreation," notwithstanding their
prior consent forms allowing her to do so."1 Following the same line of
reasoning a year later, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a wife
could stop her ex-husband from donating their embryos for procreation,
holding that creating biological parenthood, and not necessarily legal
parenthood, also amounted to unconstitutional "forced procreation."
12
It would certainly seem plausible that an egg donor who changed her
mind about donation would similarly have a right to change her mind
about biological motherhood through unwanted procreative use of
embryos formed with her eggs prior to implantation. In such an event,
it would seem both she and the intended, genetic father could block the
use of the resulting embryos against the other's wishes.
The evolving relationships in assisted reproduction also
implicate sensitive informed consent issues. For example, a gamete
donor who explicitly donates to a particular patient or for a particular
couple or procedure has not necessarily consented to any subsequent
decisions about the use or re-donation of those embryos in the event the
designated recipient has no further need for them. Whether an original
consent is broad enough or specific enough to cover re-donation or
whether a donor needs to be re-consented at the time of such proposed
future disposition may turn on both the language of the initial consent
and any ensuing legal developments. In this author's experience, older
consent forms frequently did not address such potential subsequent
uses, and re-donation may present substantial legal uncertainties for
both prospective recipients and medical professionals.
Another area of legal uncertainty is the standard of care that
professionals owe to gamete donors for recruitment, representation,
legal arrangements, and medical treatment. In two court cases from the
1990's, a state and federal appellate court each found that traditional
surrogacy brokers, as well as the various medical and legal
professionals involved, owed an affirmative duty of care to two healthy
traditional surrogates the brokers had recruited.13 The courts rejected
arguments made by the brokers (both lawyers) that because they
primarily represented the intended parents, rather than the surrogate,
they owed her no duty of care.
" A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 150 (Mass. 2000).
12j.B. v. M.B., 170 N.J. 9 (N.J. 2001).
13 Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1992); Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of
America, Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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In the 1992 case, a traditional surrogate was inseminated with
the sperm of an intended father who was not screened for
cytomegalovirus (CMV). After the surrogate, Judith Stiver, gave birth
to a severely affected child (because both she and the intended father
had CMV), she sued. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the broker, doctor
and lawyers involved all owed her an affirmative duty of protection to
keep her from harm. (in this case, the harm clearly resulted in the
surrogate delivering and raising a child with a severe genetic condition)
"[t]his ... affirmative duty of protection, marked by heightened
diligence, arises out of a special relationship because the defendants
engaged in the surrogacy business and expected to profit thereby."
' 14
The court found that duty included an obligation to design and
administer a program, including a requirement for appropriate testing---
to protect the surrogate as well as the child and contracting parents
from foreseeable harm caused by the surrogacy undertaking.
Five years later, a Pennsylvania court in a wrongful death suit
brought by a traditional surrogate relied on Stiver's reasoning also to
find a higher affirmative duty of protection owed: ". . . we conclude
that a business operating for the sole purpose of organizing and
supervising the very delicate process of creating a child, which reaps
handsome profits from such an endeavor, must be held accountable for
the foreseeable risks of the surrogacy undertaking because a 'special
relationship' exists between the surrogacy business, its client-
participants, and most especially, the child . . . ,. The surrogate,
Phyliss Huddleston, argued the broker had breached that duty by not
having investigated or counseled the intended parent-a single father-
to ensure his fitness as a parent. The twenty-six-year-old man killed
the five-week-old child by shaking him to death; the autopsy confirmed
the child had preexisting injuries as well. Only after the fact did the
surrogate learn that the father had recently lost his mother and had no
child care experience. Her lawsuit was initially dismissed, but
reinstated on appeal. The appellate court, citing Stiver, applied a higher,
affirmative standard and ruled that brokers should be liable for the
foreseeable consequences of a surrogacy arrangement, which it held
included child abuse.
While it remains to be seen whether a similar affirmative,
higher duty of care may be extended by other courts and to other forms
of collaborative reproduction, including egg donation, the rationale
behind these courts' rulings would seem applicable to similar
14 Stiver, 975 F.2d at 268.
15 Huddleston, 700 A.2d at 460.
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relationships created between other recruited third parties and the
multiple involved professionals.
As anonymous egg donation began to take off in the 19 90's,
these and other uncertainties about the legality of these families and the
vulnerabilities of the participants-recipients, donors, and offspring
began to bubble to the surface. With only a handful of state laws
addressing egg donation, a number of lawyers-including this author-
developed the practice of encouraging private legal agreements
between intended parents and donors in an attempt to at least partially
fill in those gaps. While it was impossible to predict with any certainty
that such agreements would be enforceable, at a minimum they
provided a written record of the parities' timely, negotiated, intentions.
Attorneys in this field drafted clauses to clarify the respective legal
status of the child, intended parent(s), and donor, as well as to address
payment issues, disposition of excess embryos and the donor's role-if
any-in such a decision. These terms also sought to address
prospective future contact for myriad potential reasons at the request of
any of the parties or the resulting offspring. I recommended to all of
my recipient clients that they consider making arrangements for future
contact for a variety of reasons: medical information (relevant to the
donor or child), social information, a meeting if their child wished it, or
even to request a donor re-donate for a subsequent child. We
negotiated with donor counsel (which we required donors to retain) and
wrestled with issues ranging from emotional decision-making over
reasons for future contact to pragmatic logistics of who would maintain
the contact information for the next twenty-one years or beyond.
Today, egg donation has grown from a handful of stand-alone
recruiters and small recruiting services within ART medical programs,
to become a very big business and growing bigger all the time with
over 80 recruiters listed on ASRM's website. 16 While research or stem
cell egg donors are virtually nonexistent due to current payment
restrictions, fertility or procreation donors are routinely recruited and
paid a minimum of $5,000 per donation, and often much, much more.
Egg donation has become so prevalent that stand-alone recruiting
businesses have virtually replaced medical IVF programs' donor
coordinators in most areas of the country. In just this past year, an even
newer independent entity-concierge services-has arisen, which
offers, for yet another fee, to help would-be-parents navigate the
increasingly crowded field of recruiting programs to find their "one"
16 ASRM, Egg Donor Agencies, available at
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/eggdonor-agencies.pdf (last visited on May 2, 2008).
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perfect donor.17 Potential parents may have to pay their donor, donor
recruiter, donor recruiter finder, and doctor if they live in a state
without mandated infertility coverage or do not qualify for insurance
coverage for the medical procedures involved. In the past few years,
these stand-alones have gone from being labeled (somewhat
pejoratively) "brokers" to "recruiters" to the adoption-invoking
"agencies." But, unlike adoption or other forms of legally recognized
family building, egg donation still has few rules or regulations, and
even fewer laws, protecting the participants or resulting offspring.
The legal agreements many of us once saw as protections seem
increasingly quaint if not antiquated. Today, donor attorneys typically
receive a minimal flat fee ($250-$400 in the Boston area) to represent
their clients, and the legal services may be performed via a single
telephone consultation. I have had prospective recipient clients call and
demand to pick up the "legal paper" from my receptionist, or who want
to do "the paperwork" with me over the phone. I recently learned of a
donor who called the recruiter to ask them to explain what she had just
signed 18 Recently a newer recruiter refused to allow a donor and her
attorney (who was selected by the recruiter and appeared on its
website) to even review my proposed contract without the recruiter first
previewing and approving it. The explanation given was that this was
simply done in order to "avoid stressing her out," but the process
removed any pretense of objectivity and triggered serious conflict-of-
interest concerns.
As stand-alone recruiting entities continue to proliferate and in
some instances standardize how such agreements are entered into and
assert control over issues surrounding terms, legal representation and
fees for both donors and intended parents, it remains to be seen whether
such agreements will indeed be found to protect the parties as was
initially envisioned.
On the other hand, experience continues to reinforce my belief
that models that encourage or require recipients and donors to
communicate with one another in advance of a donation cycle,
including over issues of future contact, are preferable to a hands-off
approach. I received a series of emails that reinforced my belief that
17 See, e.g. www.donorconcierge.com (last visited on May 2, 2008).
18 A disconcerting occurrence when the donor had just signed a binding legal
agreement, with the intended benefit of independent legal representation whose role
was to ensure she understood the issues, had a full opportunity to both ask and have
any questions answered and to negotiate on her behalf terms and an agreement with
which she was comfortable.
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this remains at least a small step in the right direction. First, my
recipient clients expressed both their openness and ambivalence about
including a provision in the agreement to address future contact; the
donor responded through her attorney. An excerpt of that exchange
follows:
".... We do not know if we will be telling our child they
were conceived using donor but, based on what
psychological professionals are currently stating, it is
important to try to leave that door open. We pictured it as
analogous to an open sperm donation where at 18 the child
can contact the donor agency and then see if donor can be
contacted/willing to meet ... we understand if she wishes
to take this off the table but wanted her to at least consider
this if it seems to be in the best interests of the child.
".. . [I]t is entirely up to the [recipients] as parents if/when
they decide to tell their child they were conceived using an
egg donation. Whenever they make that decision, the door
is always open for them to contact me through [the
recruiter]-whether they determine it to be before or after
the child turns 18. I am always here, and I am always open
to that. And please tell them that just that one paragraph
that they sent me made me happier than you can imagine-
not because there is a chance to meet the child, but because
they, as parents, are putting that much thought and love into
what they are deciding for their child. Their child will be
very lucky to have such caring parents ......
These emails illustrate the benefits of an individualized and hands-on
approach. Had the parties not been counseled, represented and
encouraged to address issues of future communication, it is difficult to
see how the opportunity for this personal interchange would have
presented itself. Guidelines or requirements for addressing these issues
would provide such an opportunity.
There are other signs that gamete donation is ripe for voluntary
guidelines and at least minimal legal protections, if not comprehensive
regulation. Concerns include multiple donations, misrepresentation on
recruiter websites of donor identity and age, genetic abnormalities
discovered in donors or donor offspring, consanguinity risks, and the
2009]
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potential implications of future egg freezing on a large scale similar to
frozen sperm banking.
To date, egg freezing is too recent a development in the US to
have fostered litigation, but the growing interest in commercial egg
freezing for both fertility preservation and donation will inevitably
present challenges to those administering, offering or hoping to receive
such genetic material. This evolving field is likely to confront issues
related to whether frozen donor eggs must be quarantined, structuring
compensation to donors and payments by intended parents, how
donors, intended parents, and future children may access information
about one another, and whether donors may change their mind as to
eggs that have been donated and frozen but not yet thawed or fertilized.
On the one hand, as the technology advances, there will be little
question that frozen eggs are likely to replace fresh egg cycles as the
preferred means of achieving pregnancies. On the other, such
developments will invite a return to the old sperm donor models that so
many in the field are currently challenging as insensitive to the growing
sense that these families have and should have an established means of
staying connected to some, as yet undefined, degree.
LOOKING AHEAD:
So, if tracking gamete donation is advisable, what are the
challenges ahead? Unfortunately, from a policy perspective, there
appear to be many.
What are the impediments to sharing information that donor
offspring can access? First is likely defining both the purpose and scope
of such data: is the purpose to provide information to offspring, to track
donor or offspring health issues, or to address potential donor fraud? Is
the scope limited to medical information, or does it extend to
identifying donor and genetic sibling information? The second
challenge is to examine and define the relevant privacy rights involved.
Do donors and recipients have privacy rights springing from their
constitutionally protected right to privacy and procreation? Or do
offspring have independent rights to the biological background? Under
existing laws from state to state, what are the vulnerabilities of sharing
information? Might offspring or donors have claims in states that do
not apply sperm donation models to egg donation? Might a donor open
herself up to liability or child support obligations? Fundamentally, is it
fair to establish a registry if the legal landscape is inadequate to protect
the participants? The third challenge is to determine how such
[VOL. 12.1:241
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information can be shared but limited to the intended recipients of the
information-even if there is agreement to provide some amount of
data for an agreed upon purpose to a specified set of recipients.
Inadvertent information disbursements of genetic information, or loose
controls of otherwise private health information, are practical
impediments that cannot be ignored. And finally, what of the donors or
recipients who wish to choose not to share such information?
CONCLUSION:
The opportunity to reframe the practice of gamete donation is
here and now. The experiences with adoption and sperm donation, and
increasingly from egg donation and the intertwined issues from all
forms of collaborative reproduction, provide lessons that we would be
well-advised to incorporate in establishing a new framework for gamete
donation. Some of the fears of would-be-parents, including custody
challenges, have not materialized but still likely influence policies
surrounding anonymity. Other concerns, such as legally sound
assurances that intended parents are legal parents and that donors are
not, need to be addressed with clearly drafted legislation. While the
policy challenges are not to be minimized, years of experiences with
these families by parents, donors, offspring, and all sorts of
professionals and intermediaries can be harnessed to at least attempt to
create a comprehensive framework within which to practice these
evolving forms of family building.
If professionals-be they doctors, lawyers, facilitators, brokers,
or concierges-are willing and permitted to promote anonymous
arrangements with no expectation, plan, consensus, or requirement for
future contact or even permanent preservation of information, we are
likely destined to create another generation of offspring looking for
their genetic ties and thinking none of us who helped create them are
listening or care.
The time and opportunity to learn from the past to create
thoughtful, ethical, and child-centered policies in gamete donation for
future generations is, still, here and now.
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